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I. INTRODUCTION: A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
In his novel Lost Horizon, the British author James Hilton imagines
Shangri-La, a fictional place of utopian perfection located behind the
Himalayas where the people live in peace and harmony and where the wisdom
of human kind reigns supreme.1 The secluded Kingdom of Bhutan, nestled
high in the eastern Himalayas, may very well be that elusive Shangri-La, as
the Bhutanese have managed to preserve their unique spiritual and cultural
heritage and live sustainably in harmony with the surrounding natural world. 2
Unlike the tourism and travel sectors, which constantly search for
new and exotic destinations, the legal comparative academy residing outside
Bhutan has been largely silent about the country in general and the
significance of Bhutanese constitutionalism for the country’s success story in
particular. This is not due to impenetrable language barriers since the laws of
Bhutan are readily accessible in English. While Dzongkha, the language
spoken in Bhutan’s massive fortresses, is considered preferable for drafting
purposes,3 the Constitution of Bhutan declares both the Dzongkha and English
texts as equally authoritative.4 English is ubiquitous, not only among legal
professionals, but also the population at large.
When traveling through the Kingdom of Bhutan in the spring of 2019,
we experienced unparalleled hospitality and access.5 In addition to presenting
a colloquium to students and faculty at the Jigme Singye Wangchuck School
of Law—Bhutan’s first and only law school,6 which was established in 2015
by Her Ryal Highness Princess Sonam Dechan Wangchuck in honor of
Bhutan’s Great Fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck—we had the
1 JAMES HILTON, LOST HORIZON (Macmillan 1933).
2 But see Ceil Miller Bouchet, Where Is Shangri-La?, N AT’L GEOGRAPHIC TRAVELER

(Aug.
21,
2012),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/intelligenttravel/2012/08/21/where-is-shangri-la/ (identifying Zhongdian in China’s southwestern
Yunnan Province, which officially refers to itself as Shangri-La County).
3 Vineet Gill, When Dzongkha Was Made Bhutan’s Mational Language, TSG GUARDIAN
LIVE (Sept. 10, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/culture/dzongkhamade-bhutans-national-language. But see Alessandro Simoni, A Language for Rules,
Another for Symbols: Linguistic Pluralism and Interpretation of Statutes in the Kingdom
of Bhutan, L'INTERPRÉTATION DES TEXTES JURIDIQUES RÉDIGÉS DANS PLUS D 'UNE LANGUE
273 (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 2002) (asserting that English has been appreciated for its mature
and nimble technical and legal terminology).
4 BHUTAN CONST. art. 35(4).
5 For the experience of a pre-arranged tour, which is normally required to enter Bhutan, see
Elena A. Baylis & Donald J. Munro, Simple Justice: Judicial Philosophy in the Kingdom
of Bhutan, 6 GREEN BAG 131, 133 (2003).
6 Kai Schultz, Centuries of Buddhist Tradition Make Room for Bhutan’s First Law School,
THE
NY
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/asia/centuries-of-buddhist-tradition-makeroom-for-bhutans-first-law-school.html.
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opportunity to spend time with constitutional players and witness
constitutional practices in action. It was fascinating to learn about the
ingredients of a successful constitution. Bhutan’s Constitution has selectively
borrowed from different external models, but it continues to be deeply rooted
in the holistic wisdom of Buddhist spirituality.7
Our discussions regarding courts and constitutions with judicial and
political members ultimately turned to what many American lawyers will
inevitably be tempted to ask their interlocutors abroad—whether and, if so,
how the host country experienced its own Marbury v. Madison8 moment. As
is well known, William Marbury, an uninstalled appointee of the outgoing
President John Adams, sued James Madison, Secretary of State in the new
Thomas Jefferson Administration, to procure his commission of justice of the
peace.9 In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided that Madison should have surrendered the
commission to Marbury.10 However, the U.S. Supreme Court then ruled that
the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which Marshall read to grant the high
court the original power to issue writs of mandamus,11 was unconstitutional
because it was not covered by what he considered the Supreme Court’s
reservoir of powers under the U.S. Constitution.12 Marbury, which tells a story
replete with partisan intrigues and political posturing, has come alive for
generations of lawyers all over the world as they discuss Chief Justice
Marshall’s epic maneuvers for confronting Jefferson, his disputed rationales
for recognizing the power of judicial review, and his skillful balancing of
institutional powers.13 According to literature, however, the full realization of
Marbury and its popularity beyond America’s borders in countries that have
created or revised their constitutions is a product of the twentieth century. 14

7

BHUTAN CONST. art. 3. See also Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye, His Majesty Jigme Singye
Wangchuck: The Master Strokes and Words of Wisdom of the Father of the Constitution of
Bhutan, 10 BHUTAN L. REV. 31, 34 (2018) (listing the sources that were consulted in the
course of drafting the Constitution).
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 162.
11 See id. at 176, 180.
12 Id. at 179-80.
13 Winfried Brugger, Kampf um die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit: 200 Jahre Marbury v.
Madison, in DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE USA IN DER INTERNATIONALEN GESCHICHTE DES 20.
JAHRHUNDERTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR DETLEF JUNKER 115 (Manfred Berg & Philipp Gassert
eds., 2004).
14 See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, 71 TENN. L. REV.
251, 251 (2004) (asserting that foreign “lawmaking system designers [that] have created
courts with the power to determine constitutionality [have not simply emulated] the U.S.
institution of judicial review”).
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All over the world, Marbury has come to be known as a central authority in
the field of constitutionalism.15
The Bhutanese elaborations on the themes raised by Marbury are
bundled in litigation less dramatically dubbed Opposition Party v. The
Government of Bhutan.16 The case was brought by the Representative of the
Opposition Party against the Government of Bhutan to quash the
rationalization and expansion of the extant tax structure that, said the
complaint, was undertaken by mere executive fiat and without proper
parliamentary legislation.17 In a landmark decision, the Constitutional Bench
of the High Court held for the petitioner18 and the Supreme Court of Bhutan
affirmed.19 Accordingly, the Government of Bhutan’s use of purely
administrative short cuts violated the Bhutanese Constitution, which prohibits
taxation unless it is imposed or altered by law.20 Therefore, the Government
of Bhutan had to follow the lengthier process through Bhutan’s Parliament.
Our article discusses the case within the larger context of
constitutionalism, which, for our purposes, shall be broadly understood as “the
study of the constitutive elements of legal and political practice that are central
for the assessment of its legality or legitimacy.”21 More specifically,
constitutionalism is a doctrine that is designed to prevent the arbitrary exercise
of government power.22 According to the political theories of John Locke and
through the prism of the American framers, constitutionalism reflects the dual
proposition that government can and should be restrained in the scope and
exercise of its powers and that the authority of government hinges on the
observance of these limits.23
The remainder of the article will analyze the Bhutanese Marbury
against the American original and the questions raised by Marbury. Are these
15

Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
16 Opposition Party v. Government, Judgment 11-1, Sup. Ct. of Bhutan (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/judg/2011/englishj.pdf [hereinafter, Opposition Party, SC
Judgment 11-1; Opposition Leader v. Government, Judgment 10-100, High Ct. of Bhutan
1, 3 (Nov. 18, 2010), http://oag.gov.bt/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Constitutional-CaseEnglish.pdf [hereinafter, Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100].
17 Id. at 3-4.
18 Id. at 67-68.
19 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16.
20 BHUTAN CONST. art. 14(1).
21
Cambridge Univ. Press, Call for Papers: Manuscript Submission,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/call-for-papers
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2021).
22 Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS 218,
219 (Daniele Caramani, ed. 2017).
23 Tohid Asadi, En Route to the US Constitution: Founding Fathers and Lockean
Philosophy, 16 HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 407, 411 (2015).
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types of constitutional disputes typically precipitated when a unique story and
particular actors combine? Where does the power of constitutional review
repose? How is constitutional jurisdiction organized? What role do prudential
gatekeeper doctrines that patrol access to the courts play? How do judicial
canons of interpretation act to limit judicial activism? What are the trajectories
for countries wishing to entrench the constitutional rule of law?
II. PRECIPITATORS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES: UNIQUE NARRATIVE
AND POLITICAL ACTORS
The stories behind both cases boast unique circumstances and actors.
Marbury features a political kabuki theatre of events and protagonists that has
fascinated generations of readers. The case arose in the wake of the election
of 1800, which had featured a fierce contest between John Adams, the
Federalist incumbent, and Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic-Republican
challenger.24 Thomas Jefferson prevailed.25 But John Adams embarked on a
program to execute a plan to perpetuate power by using his remaining time in
office, which, at the time, lasted until March 4, 1801, to make the judiciary a
last Federalist bastion.26 Fresh legislation creating hundreds of new
judgeships had conveniently been passed by the lame duck Federalist
Congress—the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the Justice of the Peace Act of
1801.27 Just before the Federalist hold in the political branches ended, John
Adams appointed, and the Senate confirmed several dozen “midnight
judges.”28 But time ran out before a certain number of the commissions, which
carried the President’s signature and the Senate’s seal, could have been
delivered by John Marshall, the outgoing Secretary of State.29 One of those
commissions never delivered was intended for William Marbury, a veteran of
the Revolutionary War from Maryland and a superbly networked Federalist
of great influence and financial acumen.30 He had been slated to serve as
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia—a judgeship typically
overseeing cases that involve small claims, marriages, adoptions, and
divorces.31 After assuming the presidency, Thomas Jefferson, however,
ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, a founding father from
Virginia and major player in Thomas Jefferson’s cabinet, not to deliver the
24

Burt Likko, The Great Cases, No. 1: Marbury v. Madison, ORDINARY TIMES (Dec. 15,
2011), https://arc.ordinary-times.com/notapottedplant/2011/12/15/the-great-cases-no-1marbury-v-madison/.
25 See id.
26
See id.
27 See id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See Likko, supra note 24.
31 Id.
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commissions.32 Interestingly, if the Supreme Court, with John Marshall now
at the helm, had ruled for William Marbury, James Madison would have been
in the unenviable position to enforce the order against himself.33 Also, John
Marshall’s own involvement in the case raised the specters of partialities and
bias, as he had been responsible for the delivery of the commissions as John
Adams’s Secretary of State.34 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall must have been
well aware of the sword of impeachment that was hanging over him. 35
At first blush, Bhutan’s Opposition Party does not appear to rise to a
level of drama on par with the cocktail of partisan politics ginned up in
Marbury. The litigation in Opposition Party, which pitted the executive
against the legislature, was steered by Former Lyonpo Damcho Dorji, who
was a Member of Parliament in the National Assembly of Bhutan.36 Educated
at Delhi University, the Government Law College in Mumbai and the
Georgetown University Law Center in Washington D.C., Lyonpo Damcho
Dorji was steeped in the teachings of Marbury.37 He had previously served as
a judge before being appointed the first Attorney General of Bhutan.38 Also,
after the People’s Democratic Party had won the election in 2013, he served
as Bhutan’s Home Minister and later as Foreign Minister.39 When the case
took shape, he was keenly aware that Bhutan’s Marbury moment had
arrived.40 At the time, the two parties represented in the National Assembly
of Bhutan included the Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party (Druk Phuensum
Tshogpa or BPPP), which had won the elections with forty-five seats, and the
People’s Democratic Party (Miser Dmangstsoi Tshogspa or PDP), which

32

Id.
See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 18 DUKE L.J. 1
(1969) (“If Madison, on Jefferson's instruction, had refused to honor that writ how would
it have been enforced?”).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See Sonam Ongmo, Bhutan: Tax or No Tax for Development, GLOBAL VOICES (Feb. 24,
2011,
9:22
PM),
https://globalvoices.org/2011/02/24/bhutan-tax-or-no-tax-fordevelopment/.
37 BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR UNTERRICHT, KUNST UND KULTUR, Curriculum vitae, Bhutan:
Minister for Home and Cultural Affairs Damcho Dorji, https://bilaterales.bmbwf.gv.at/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/bilaterales_dok_2189.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
38 History, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN),
https://www.oag.gov.bt/language/en/history/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
39 Bhutan Foreign Minister to Be Sacked, THE DAILY STAR (July 22, 2015, 12:42 PM),
https://www.thedailystar.net/world/bhutan-foreign-minister-be-sacked-115018. See also
Background, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF BHUTAN,
https://www.mfa.gov.bt/?page_id=8681 (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) (offering that Lyonpo
Damcho Dorji served as Foreign Minister from August 2015 until August 2018).
40 Personal conversation with Lyonpo Damcho Dorji, Former-Attorney General, Foreign
Minister, and Member of Parliament of Bhutan, in Thimphu, Bhutan (May 26, 2019).
33
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formed the opposition with only two members41—Opposition Leader Dasho
Tshering Tobgay and Former Lyonpo Damcho Dorji.42 In the lawsuit, the
Ruling Government was represented by the State Prosecutor from the Office
of Attorney General.43 Notably, several judges and justices of Bhutan, who
had spent significant amounts of time in the United States and other
countries—whether for purposes of post-graduate education, research stints
and conference interventions—were intimately familiar with Marbury.44
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW THROUGH THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT:
POWER BASE AND ORGANIZATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION
In general, constitutional review occurs when acts of government
come into conflict with a constitution that sits at the apex in a hierarchy of
legal norms. Both Marbury and Opposition Party are premised on “higher
law” constitutions,45 as opposed to legislative supremacy constitutions46 or
absolutist constitutions.47 The higher law constitution, which is typically
written and entrenched, embodies real law equipped with primacy.48 Marbury
speaks of the U.S. Constitution as “fundamental and paramount law.”49 In
Opposition Party, the High Court of Bhutan explains that “[t]he Constitution
is the embodiment of best practices and recognizes the doctrine of Separation
of Powers . . . .”50
Marbury and Opposition Party further agree in assigning the review
power to the judicial department, as opposed to everyone within the ambit of
the constitution. Echoing Marbury almost verbatim, the High Court of Bhutan
See BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, BTI 2020 COUNTRY REPORT – BHUTAN 4 (2020),
https://www.btiproject.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_BTN.pdf.
42 See Kuenzang Choden, PDP MP Damcho Dorji Ready to Join a New Party If PDP Does
Not Make It Past the Primary Round, T HE BHUTANESE (May 23, 2012),
https://thebhutanese.bt/pdp-mp-damcho-dorji-ready-to-join-a-new-party-if-pdp-does-notmake-it-past-the-primary-round/.
43 Press Release, Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Royal Government of Bhutan), Appointment of
New Attorney General 2010, https://www.oag.gov.bt/language/en/appointment-of-newattorney-general-2010/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
44 Personal conversation with The Hon. Mr. Justice Lyonpo Tshering Wangchuk (Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Bhutan), in Thimphu, Bhutan (May 30, 2019) (recalling his own
LL.M. studies at the George Washington University School of Law).
45 Sweet, supra note 22, at 221.
46 Id. at 220-21 (identifying the British and New Zealand parliamentary systems as
examples).
47 Id. at 220 (offering that this type of constitution no longer exists as a viable model).
48 Id. at 221 (observing that legislative sovereignty is rejected under this type of
constitution).
49 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
50 Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, at 33.
41
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declares that “the Constitution emphatically expounds the province and duty
of the judicial branch to say what the law is or the Constitution means.”51
Thematically both decisions are thus rooted in constitutional
frameworks predicated upon the separation of powers and checks and
balances. These topics echo the works of Lord Bolingbroke, who recognized
the ideal of an approximate equilibrium short of a perfectly balanced system,52
and Montesquieu, who identified the locution of “le pouvoir arrête le
pouvoir” or, power limiting power, as the remedy against abuse.53
Marbury and Opposition Party mark the rise of robust judicial
review: Marbury addressed the unconstitutionality of a jurisdiction grant in
an act of the Congress, while Opposition Party focused on the
unconstitutional arrogation of lawmaking power by the government. Both
cases embody a rejection of alternative models for the design of constitutional
review. New Zealand, for example, does not give the courts the prerogative to
strike down legislation deemed to exceed constitutional limits; rather, the
legislative bodies themselves are charged to observe and enforce those
limits.54 Incidentally, the American constitutional convention discussed, but
ultimately rejected a hybrid model—a “Council of Revision” consisting of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and the President of the United States, equipped
with the power to veto Acts of Congress.55
According to the Supreme Court of Bhutan, “[j]udicial review is an
example of the functioning of separation of powers in a modern governmental
system.”56 Chief Justice Marshall and his successors, especially those of the
modern era, would certainly agree. But under the magnifying glass, specific
design features associated with judicial review in Bhutan and the United
States exhibit important distinctions.

51

Id.
Michael Sheehan, The Place of the Balancer in Balance of Power Theory, 15 REV. INT’L
STUD. 123, 125 (1989).
53 DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS, PAR MONTESQUIEU – PRÉCÉDÉ DE L’ANALYSE DE CET OUVRAGE
PAR D’ALEMBERT, TOME PREMIER 291 (Paris, P. Pourrat Brothers eds., 1831).
54 Andrew Geddis, Parliamentary Government in New Zealand: Lines of Continuity and
Moments of Change, 15 INT’L J. CONST. L. 99 (2016).
55 See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 254. See also Robert L. Jones, Lessons from a Lost
Constitution: The Council of Revision, the Bill of Rights, and the Role of the Judiciary in
Democratic Governance, 27 J. L. & POL. 459 (2012); James T. Barry, The Council of
Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1989).
56
Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.4. See also Yeshey Dorji,
Constitution of Kingdom of Bhutan: Ten Salient Features, 10 BHUTAN L. REV. 67, 78
(2018) (anchoring judicial review in the combination of constitutional provisions: Article
9, Section 3, which mandates creation of a civil society based on the rule of law and
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people, and Article 1, Section 11,
which identifies the Supreme Court as guardian).
52
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A. The Power Base
A central message shared by Marbury and Opposition Party pertains
to positioning the judicial review power within a constitutional system of
government. This then raises the question of who, in the words of Abbé
Sieyès, is the “pouvoir constituant,” the enabler of all government power?57
i.

Constitutional Silence and Sovereign Will of the People in
the United States

In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall had to overcome the
constitutional silence with regard to the basis and scope of the judicial review
power he ultimately extracted.58 The U.S. Constitution is, of course, the
product of historical experiences and vigorous debates. For example, during
colonial times some state judiciaries had adopted the practice of reviewing
colonial acts of legislation as to whether they were ultra vires under the
colonial charter.59 Also, the Privy Council in London, which advised the
monarch as to matters of state, exercised the power to control colonial
decisions and legislation.60 Finally, the topic was extensively discussed in
Philadelphia and the ratification conventions in the various states.61
Because neither the text nor the intent of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution itself are dispositive, Marbury boldly anchors the judicial review
power in the constitutional system of government created by the people
through the exercise of their “original right” and their “original and supreme
will.”62 Popular sovereignty thus is the organizing principle behind all
government power.63

57

EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 1788-1790, at 166, 214, 250
(Eberhard Schmitt & Rolf Reichart eds., 1975).
58 ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43706, THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AVOIDANCE: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 3 (2014).
59 CHARLES F. ABERNATHY & MARKUS G. PUDER, LAW OF THE UNITED STATES – CASES AND
COMMENTARIES 164 (3d ed. 2021).
60 Id.
61 Compare The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (advocating constitutional review
by the judicial department), with Brutus No. 15, in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
2:437-42 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (warning against “exalt[ing the Supreme Court]
above all other power in the government . . . .”). See also James Bradley Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Review, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
62 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176, 179-80.
63 See Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: Tensions
in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L. J. 2644 (2014) (offering a critical discussion of
Bruce Ackerman’s three-volume work “We the People”).
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The People’s Constitution in Bhutan

In Opposition Party, the crucial language for the repository of the
judicial review power in Bhutan’s constitutional system of government arrives
with the solemn and flowery language directed by the Supreme Court of
Bhutan at the Bhutanese people at large. By declaring its own unwavering
commitment to the Constitution of Bhutan, the Supreme Court makes clear
that the judicial review power springs from the people. Yet, in light of the
central role played by the King (Druk Gyalpo) in this process, some
commentators have offered that constitutionalism in Bhutan has been a “top
down” exercise,64 with the King having gifted the constitution to his people.65
This diagnosis, however, ignores the transcendental position held by
the King in Bhutanese spiritual life. Moreover, it disregards the mysticism
associated with the reincarnations of the lamas in Bhutan’s cultural heritage
in general and Bhutan’s revered unifier Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal in
particular.66 If one were to invoke the notion of a gift, the entire constitutional
process could be considered as such because it was predicated upon a
peaceful, orderly, and popular process rather than untidy revolutionary
convulsions.67 Significantly, when the constitution was consecrated in 2008,
the King, who symbolizes the unity of Bhutan and its people, 68 embraced the
occasion to emphasize the idea of popular sovereignty in the constitution
when he observed that “[e]ach word ha[d] earned its place with the blessings
of every citizen” and that it was “the [P]eople’s Constitution.” 69 Moreover, at
the outset of the drafting process, his predecessor had declared that Bhutan’s
destiny was “in the hands of our people” and that the future constitution
“should not be considered as a gift from the King.”70 Both Kings thus
underline the idea of popular sovereignty as government power that ultimately
64

Venkat Iyer, Constitution-Making in Bhutan: A Complex and Sui Generis Experience, 7
CHINA J. COMPAR. L. 359, 383 (2019).
65 Winnie Bothe, The Monarch’s Gift: Critical Notes on the Constitutional Process in
Bhutan, 40 EUR. BULL. HIMALAYAN RSCH. 27, 27 (2012).
66 See generally Royal Education Council (Royal Government of Bhutan), A History of
Bhutan (2019) (narrating the life history of eight great pioneers of Kagyud and Drukpa
Kagyud traditions). See also Alessandro Simoni & Richard W. Whitecross, Gross National
Happiness and the Heavenly Stream of Justice: Modernization and Dispute Resolution in
the Kingdom of Bhutan, 55 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 165, 169 (2007) (translating the honorific
Zhabdrung with “at whose feet one prostrates”).
67 The Hon. Mr. Justice Lyonpo Tshering Wangchuk, Constitution, Rule of Law and
Democracy in Bhutan, 10 BHUTAN L. REV. 6, 7 (2018).
68
BHUTAN CONST. art. 2(1).
69 United Nations Development Programme Bhutan & Parliament of the Kingdom of
Bhutan, Bhutan National Human Development Report – Ten Years of Democracy in
Bhutan 52 (2019) (offering Justice Sonam Tobgye’s quote from His Majesty the Fourth
King’s Address to the Nation at the Launch of the Constitution, Thimphu, Sept. 20, 2018).
70 See Wangchuk, supra note 67, at 7.
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resides in the sovereign people.71 Finally, the Preamble to the Constitution
attributes the rise of the document to “WE, the people of Bhutan.” 72 In
addition to identifying the source of the document, the Preamble elevates the
people’s authority by explaining who the people are and how they came to
be.73 It completes the circle by declaring the people one with Bhutan’s
religious, spiritual, and cultural heritage.74
B. The Organization of Constitutional Jurisdiction
In most countries, constitutional jurisdiction is organized as some
variant of two basic models. Under the diffuse paradigm, which is also known
as the American model, the function of constitutional jurisdiction tends to be
exercised by all courts within the system.75 Contrariwise, under the
concentrated paradigm, which is also known as the Austrian or Kelsenian
model, constitutional jurisdiction falls to a separate and specialized court. 76
i.

Court Structure in Bhutan

The judiciary of Bhutan, which is generically referred to as the Royal
Court of Justice,77 is a separate and self-governing branch of the Bhutanese
government.78 In contrast to American judicial federalism and the dual court
structure in the United States,79 the Judiciary of Bhutan, which features four

71

See JOHN L. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 48-49 (1995)
(expounding the command theory). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 25-29 (3d
ed. 2012) (pointing to the paradox of the commanders commanding the commanders).
72 BHUTAN. CONST. prmbl.
73 Adeno Addis, Constitutional Preambles as Narratives of Peoplehood, 12 VIENNA J.
INT’L CONST. L. 125 (2018) (“preambles are performative in nature: they constitute the
people as they at the same time declare that the people are their authors”).
74 BHUTAN CONST. prmbl. (“BLESSED by the Triple Gem, the protection of our guardian
deities, the wisdom of our leaders, the everlasting fortunes of the Pelden Drukpa and the
guidance of His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck”).
75 Matthias Jestaedt, Verfassungsgericht ist nicht gleich Verfassungsgericht [Constitutional
Court Does Not Equal Constitutional Court], 74/10 JURISTENZEITUNG (JZ) 473, 476 (2019)
(dating the emergence to the establishment of a supreme court by the U.S. Constitution of
1787).
76 Jestaedt, supra note 75, at 476 (observing that this model is owed to the Austrian Federal
Constitutional Law of 1920, which installed a constitutional court). See also Christoph
Bezemek, A Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Adjudication – The Austrian Constitutional
Court, 67 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT [ZÖR] 115 (2012).
77 BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(2).
78 Wangchuk, supra note 67, at 8.
79 For the proposition that this dimension of duality has frequently been overlooked, see
John W. Winkle III, Dimensions of Judicial Federalism, 416 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 67 (1974) (arguing that the duality not only affects litigant behavior, judicial
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tiers,80 is unitary. The Supreme Court sits at the apex of the Royal Court of
Justice, followed by the High Court, and, at the district and certain sub-district
levels, the Dzongkhag and Dungkhag courts.81 Bhutan does not have courts
or tribunals of special jurisdiction.82 Significantly, the Dzongkhag courts83
and the Dungkhag courts84 do not enjoy the jurisdictional competence to
perform constitutional review.85 Rather, the High Court is the designated court
of first instance for all constitutional cases86 and its Constitutional Bench will
hear substantial questions of law of general importance relating to the
interpretation of the Constitution of Bhutan.87 Once the High Court’s
judgment has been rendered, the aggrieved party to the litigation may appeal
to the Larger Bench of the High Court and then to the higher appellate court—
the Supreme Court of Bhutan—which exercises its appellate constitutional
jurisdiction as the Apex Court. However, while the case is pending before any
other lower court, the Supreme Court may by its own motion, or on the
application by either party to the lawsuit, take over the case and decide it. 88
The Supreme Court, a court of record,89 is the designated guardian of the
Constitution and final authority on interpreting the Constitution.90 Bhutan’s
take on constitutional jurisdiction cannot be neatly captured with the
categories of diffuse and concentrated. Rather, Bhutan has found its own
version, which, in addition to relying on its cultural and traditional values and
practices, creatively blends both models to achieve a modern judiciary for the
Bhutanese people. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Bhutan exhibits hybrid
features.

policy making and court administration but also raises questions of intersystem
reconciliation).
80 BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(2).
81 Royal Court of Justice Bhutan, Structure of the Royal Court of Justice,
http://www.judiciary.gov.bt/index.php/Welcome/get_pages?id=22%20&cat=5
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2021).
82 See id.
83 Id. (explaining how each of Bhutan’s twenty districts has one court that acts either as
first instance court or appellate court).
84 Id. (describing how fifteen sub-district courts act as first instance courts operate in six
districts).
85 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.5. See also Baylis &
Munro, supra note 5, at 134-35 (addressing the role of the district court).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(9).
89 Royal Court of Justice Bhutan, supra note 81.
90 BHUTAN CONST. art. 1(11).
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Diffuse and Concentrated Features of the Supreme Court of
Bhutan

In similarity to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is competent to hear
a variety of cases, the Supreme Court of Bhutan serves as a court of last resort
with general jurisdiction.91 Like its American counterpart, the Supreme Court
of Bhutan does not entertain requests for preliminary rulings submitted by the
lower courts. Such a device of constitutional jurisdiction is known in Germany
as concrete judicial review (konkrete Normenkontrolle).92 It functions like a
conversation between judges. If a German court within its hierarchical system
considers that its decision will hinge on a law it deems unconstitutional, the
court is bound to make a reference to the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht).93 The lawsuit pauses until the Federal
Constitutional Court decides the constitutionality questions referred to it. 94 A
French analogue was brought online by way of a constitutional reform that
added ex post review (contrôle a posteriori) to the portfolio of the
Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel).95 The new device, which
may be functionally described as a reference for a preliminary ruling on the
constitutionality of laws already in force, is literally called “priority question
of constitutionality” (question prioritaire de constitutionalité or QPC).96 The
QPC is available to all litigants at any stage of the proceedings before a court
of first instance and courts of appeal in administrative as well as civil and
criminal matters.97 Unlike Germany’s concrete judicial review, the QPC
installs a filtered version, which is steered by tight timelines. 98 At the outset,
the court petitioned by a litigant must determine whether the statutory
conditions for the QPC are met.99 If the determination is affirmative, the lower
court transmits the QPC to the highest hierarchical court within its system—
91

See id. at art. 21(7-10).
Jestaedt, supra note 75, at 478.
93 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 100(1) (Ger.).
94 Donald P. Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L. J. 837,
841 (1991) (emphasizing that judges in regular proceedings may not declare laws
unconstitutional).
95 CONST. art. 61-1 (Fra.). See Assemblée Nationale, Fiche de Synthèse no 39: Le Contrôle
de la Constitutionnalité des Lois, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-lassemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-de-l-assembleenationale/les-fonctions-legislatives/le-controle-de-la-constitutionnalite-des-lois
(last
visited Nov. 5, 2021).
96 Ann Creelman, US-Style Judicial Review for France?, PRIMERUS (Oct. 2010),
https://www.primerus.com/files/USStyle%20Judicial%20Review%20for%20France(2).pdf .
97 Id. at 2.
98 Arthur Dyevre, Filtered Constitutional Review and the Reconfiguration of Inter-Judicial
Relations, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 729, 744 (2013).
99 Id. at 743.
92
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the Council of State (Conseil d’État) in administrative matters and the Court
of Cassation (Cour de Cassation) in civil and criminal law matters.100 These
then make their own admissibility determination before referring the QPC to
the Constitutional Council.101 Finally, for both Germany and France, there is
also a European Union dimension, with its own reference proceeding for a
preliminary ruling.102
While not engaging in concrete judicial review, the Supreme Court
of Bhutan exercises a form of abstract judicial review that is normally
attributed to the concentrated model. In addition to being equipped with
appellate constitutional jurisdiction, subject to a prerogative to seize pending
constitutional cases, the Supreme Court of Bhutan also abstractly functions as
a constitutional advisor to the King103 who has been given the prerogative to
refer a question of law or fact that is of such of public importance that it
requires judicial resolution.104 Such a request for advice may, for example,
pertain to the compatibility of a statute with the Constitution. 105 The
Bhutanese version of advisory review, which creatively borrows from the
Kelsenian model and invokes the image of the executive watchdog (chien de
garde de l’exécutif) wrought into institutional designs in France106 and the
European Union,107 distinguishes the Supreme Court of Bhutan from the
design of the U.S. Supreme Court, which does not give the U.S. President the
right to initiate such a review.108 The question of whether the King’s
prerogative also envelops what the Europeans call pre-enforcement review
has yet to be put to a judicial test.109 A variant of this type of review has been
known in France. Accordingly, a political authority (the President of the
100

Id. at 744 fig. 4.
Creelman, supra note 96, at 2.
102 See generally François-Xavier Millet & Nicoletta Perlo, The First Preliminary
Reference of the French Constitutional Court to the CJEU: Révolution de Palais or
Revolution in French Constitutional Law, 16 GERMAN L. J. 1471 (2015).
103 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.4.
104 BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(8).
105 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.4.
106 See Jestaedt, supra note 75, at 475-76 (discussing the French Constitution of the Fifth
Republic).
107 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 17, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 13, art. 17 (European Commission to “ensure the application of the Treaties,
and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them . . . [and to] oversee the
application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”);
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 258,
260, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 154 (European Commission standing to see through
the Member State infringement procedure).
108 See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 2744, 2771 (2003).
109 See Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.4(a) (speaking of
“Abstract Judicial Review” in this context).
101
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Republic, the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Senate and National
Assembly) as well as sixty members or senators have the prerogative to trigger
the French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) into a review of
legislation, but only before promulgation.110 When exercising ex ante review
(contrôle a priori), the Constitutional Council has been characterized as a
third legislative chamber.111 Incidentally, certain ex ante advisory functions
with regard to legislation also reside in the Council of State (Conseil
d’État).112 In addition to advising the Government on its bills and draft
ordinances,113 the Council of State may be asked for its opinion by the
President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate with
regard to a draft bill tabled by a member of their respective chamber before it
is considered in committee, unless that member objects.114
Unlike the United States, where the power exercised in Marbury falls
upon all federal and state courts, which have jurisdiction over cases arising
under federal law,115 judicial review in Bhutan is not diffuse.116 Accordingly,
as Bhutan’s district and sub-district courts do not hear constitutional
matters,117 there is no debate surrounding a relatively recent but significant
phenomenon that has received much attention in the United States—
“nationwide” or “universal” injunctions issued by individual judges. These
injunctions are uniquely sweeping in their purported effects. 118 They do not
only command the government to obey the court’s orders beyond its territorial
jurisdiction, but also operate to block government policies from being
enforced against anyone across the United States, as opposed to being
concretely confined to the litigants of the case at bar.119 Not surprisingly, the
practice has witnessed the rise of partisan advocates and detractors from
110

CONST. art. 61(2) (Fra.). For a concise overview, see Assemblée Nationale, Fiche de
Synthèse no 39: Le Contrôle de la Constitutionnalité des Lois, http://www2.assembleenationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale/lesfonctions-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-legislatives/le-controle-de-laconstitutionnalite-des-lois.
111 TOM GINSBURG, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW, U.S. INST. PEACE 4 (2011),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ROL/TG_Memo_on_Constitutional_Review%20f
or%202011_v4.pdf (comparing the pre-reform Council to a third house of the legislator as
opposed to a court).
112 CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, THE COUNSEIL D’ÉTAT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE J USTICE SYSTEM 3
(2012), available at https://www.conseil-etat.fr/Media/actualites/documents/reprise_contenus/bilans-d-activite/ra-conseil-etat-2012-english.pdf.
113 CONST. arts. 39(2), 38(2) (Fra.).
114 CONST. art. 39(5) (Fra.).
115
ABERNATHY & PUDER, supra note 59, at 169.
116 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.5
117 Id.
118 Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920
(2020).
119 ABERNATHY & PUDER, supra note 59, at 169-70.
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across party lines.120 Supporters have argued that national injunctions are a
necessary adjunct to the type of decentralized judicial review ushered in by
Marbury.121 Critics have countered that “the routine issuance of universal
injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the
government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions.”122
Another design feature that distinguishes constitutional jurisdiction
in Bhutan from the American counterpart pertains to the effects of
unconstitutionality rulings. In Marbury, the U.S. Supreme Court explains that
“a legislative act contrary to the [C]onstitution is not law.123 The Court further
declares that “a law repugnant to the [C]onstitution is void.”124 American
courts, however, do not technically wipe away legislation when they declare
laws in part or in their entirety unconstitutional. Rather, such legislation, even
if it remains on the books, is disabled in that no court will enforce it. It may
very well be that this approach reflects Montesquieu’s famous locution about
the third power—that it was “in some measure next to nothing” (en quelque
façon nulle).125
In contrast to American practice, concentrated systems equip their
guardian courts with the power to quash legislation with immediate effects. 126
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, for example, declares
unconstitutional legislation either null and void (nichtig), which means the
legislation is gone for all intents and purposes, or incompatible (unvereinbar),
which gives the legislature a window in time to change the legislation so as to
bring it into constitutional compliance.127

120

For an illustrative debate between Professors Samuel Bray and Amanda Frost, see, for
example, Are Nationwide Injunctions Legal?, 102 JUDICATURE 70 (2018).
121 See id. at 72 (Professor Bray’s response as to why nationwide injunctions are becoming
more commonplace: “[o]nce we’re in the grip of metaphorical language about judges
‘striking down’ statutes, then it’s only a short downhill step to the national injunction . . .
[because once it is struck down] why is it still doing something to someone?”). See also
Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil Litigation
Components U.S. Att’ys, Litigation Guidelines for Cases Presenting the Possibility of
Nationwide Injunctions (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1093881/download (recalling that “[t]he Department [of Justice] consistently
has argued against granting relief outside of the parties to the case”).
122 See Adam White, Congress Should Fix the Nationwide Injunction Problem with a
Lottery, YALE J. ON REG. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/congress-shouldfix-the-nationwide-injunction-problem-with-a-lottery/ (quoting from J. Gorsuch’s
concurring opinion in Department of Homeland Security v. New York).
123 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78.
124 Id. at 180.
125 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 53, at 300.
126 Ginsburg, supra note 111, at 4.
127 Id. at 5.
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Bhutan squarely follows the concentrated model with regard to the
effects of unconstitutionality.128 In Opposition Party, the High Court and the
Supreme Court strike down the introduction of taxation measures, declare the
scheme null and void, and direct the Government to refund all taxes that were
collected on the basis of unconstitutional law.129
IV. GATEKEEPER DOCTRINES: RULES OF STANDING AND THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE
Marbury and Opposition Party identify and discuss thresholds that
must be met before a plaintiff is allowed into the courtroom. These include,
in contemporary American parlance, the rules of standing and the political
question doctrine. Under the rules of standing, which embody the U.S.
Supreme Court’s gloss with regard to the Case or Controversy Clause in the
U.S. Constitution,130 the plaintiff must be injured in fact, the injury must be
traceable to the defendant’s action that the plaintiff challenges, and the injury
must be amenable to being redressed by a favorable decision from the court.131
The U.S. Supreme Court’s political question doctrine queries whether a court
is properly seized or whether the political system of accountability is the best
mechanism for resolving a matter.132 Doctrines related to standing and
BHUTAN CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2 (“However, the provisions of any law, whether made
before or after the coming into force of this Constitution, which are inconsistent with this
Constitution, shall be null and void”).
129 Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, supra note 16, at 67 (23.3) & 68 (23.4);
Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 6.6.
130 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For the assertion that the standing doctrine has been fabricated
by the U.S. Supreme Court, see John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009
(2002).
131 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (setting forth the three
prongs required for standing: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability). For
a critical appraisal of those rules and other limitations to having your day in court, see
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE 133-35 (2017).
132 For the famous six alternative factors that may trigger the political question doctrine,
see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“[A] textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). See also Drew
McLelland & Sam Walsh, Student Briefing Paper, Litigating Challenges to Federal
Spending Decisions: The Role of Standing and Political Question Doctrine, Briefing Paper
No. 33 (May 1, 2006) (Harvard Law School, Federal Budget Policy Seminar) at 24
128
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political question inquiries include the “no advisory doctrine,” which forbids
federal courts to adjudge the constitutionality of a law before it has been
adopted, and the “ripeness doctrine,” which bars courts from hearing claims
before the government has finalized a decision that could affect a particular
plaintiff.133
A. Convergence of the Standing and Political Question Doctrines in the
United States
As both gatekeeper doctrines—standing and political question—
implicate justiciability and separation of powers, contemporary literature has
asserted that under Marbury, the rules of standing, which focus on the person
of the particular plaintiff who alleges concrete injury, and the political
question doctrine, which shields certain decision spaces from judicial patrol,
have been characterized as “two sides of the same coin.”134 If a plaintiff asserts
that an individual right has been injured, the lawsuit can by definition not raise
a political question.135 In other words, the standing analysis could be deployed
to supplant the attributes of the political doctrine query of cognizability. 136
Literature has confirmed a trend to this regard in the U.S. Supreme Court over
the past several decades.137
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall famously plants the seeds for the
rise of the political question doctrine by “[i]nquir[ing] whether there be in its
composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation, or
exclude the injured party from legal redress.”138 He concludes:
[T]hat, where the heads of departments are the political or
confidential agents of the [E]xecutive, merely to execute the
will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the
(summarizing that the first factor involves textual analysis, the second factor raises
institutional competence, and the last four factors concern prudential interests); Markus
G. Puder, Guidance and Control Mechanisms for the Construction of UN-System Law—
Sung and Unsung Tales from the Coalition of the Willing, or Not, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV.
143, 165-69 (comparing foreign analogues of the political question doctrine in the context
of the Second Gulf War: (1) the United Kingdom, with its threshold of (non-)justiciability,
(2) Costa Rica, with its trend towards judicialization; and (3) Germany, with its notion of
a certain non-judicial space of appraisal and prognosis).
133 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12 (8th ed. 2010).
134 McLelland & Walsh, supra note 132, at 2.
135 HOWARD FINK & MARK T USHNET, FEDERAL J URISDICTION: P OLICY AND PRACTICE 231
(1987).
136 Linda Sandstrom Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need The Political Question
Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 306, 333 (1996).
137 McLelland & Walsh, supra note 132, at 32-34 (noting that the Court has found a
political question only twice since Baker).
138 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
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[E]xecutive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are
only politically examinable.139
One could facetiously query whether constitutional review itself is
not of a political nature, rather than being strictly legal.140 Conversely,
standing subtly rears its head in Marbury in the passages covering injury and
remedy: where there is a right, there is a remedy (ubi ius ibi remedium).141 At
the time, access to court hinged on the substantive law at bar and the Common
Law’s stringent pleading and other form requirements kept most suits within
the confines of a case sufficiently judicial in nature. 142 Marbury thus
recognizes that certain prudential rules and doctrines, though designed to have
the most closely affected parties, at the right time, in the courtroom, have the
potential to limit judicial review.
B.

Operations and Variants of Standing Doctrines in Bhutan

Opposition Party zeroes in on the standing side of the coin. In
general, judicial review in Bhutan requires a live controversy.143 Bhutan’s
High Court recites the framework of component elements developed in the
United States with regard to the case-and-controversy requirement: a proper
plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury in fact that is causally connected
to the defendant’s actions and that can be redressed by a decision from the
adjudging court.144 The analysis then branches into subvariants of “locus
standi”—opposition party standing, taxpayer standing and public interest
standing.145
i.

Opposition Party Standing

In general and in contrast to the U.S. Constitution, which makes no
mention of political parties, not the least because the framers were wary of

139

Id. at 166.
ABERNATHY & PUDER, supra note 59, at 191-92. See also Louis Henkin, Is There a
Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (arguing that the act of consulting
the text to determine who has power to decide the case, joined with the act of consulting
cases for legal standards, is the act of constitutional adjudication in Marbury).
141
ABERNATHY & PUDER, supra note 59, at 163-73.
142 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988) (“syllogism of forms”).
143 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.4.
144 Opposition Party, HC Judgment, 10-100, supra note 16, at 29.
145 Id. at 27-35.
140
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political factions and partisan bickering,146 Bhutan’s Constitution expressly
endows political parties with a full-fledged constitutional status.147 At first
blush, this approach seems reminiscent of language in Germany’s
Constitution, which tasks political parties with partaking “in the formation of
the political will of the people.”148 But under closer scrutiny, Bhutan’s version
reflects the yin-and-yang of fundamental rights and fundamental duties under
the Constitution of Bhutan.149 Political parties in Bhutan are constitutionally
committed to the national interests150 and purposed to offer the Bhutanese
people different choices to promote Bhutan’s sustainable and balanced
development for the well-being of its people151 in pursuit of Gross National
Happiness.152 The Constitution of Bhutan further establishes interconnected
dyads—a primary and a general round of elections to ensure a two-party
system in parliament153 and, in reflection of the outcomes, a bifurcation into
the Ruling Party and the Opposition Party.154
Opposition Party standing, which embodies a legal interest separate
from the petitioner in his or her individual capacity as an aggrieved party, is
moored to the institutional role of the parliamentary opposition under
Bhutan’s Constitution.155 The constitutional function of the Opposition Party
embodies the proper participation of all governed. Within Bhutan’s holistic
system of democratic governance, the Opposition Party is absolutely
essential—not only to ensure the accountability of those who govern but also
146

See e.g., Lee Drutman, America Is Now the Divided Republic the Framers Feared, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/two-partysystem-broke-constitution/604213/ (offering two famous quotes: (1) “[t]he alternate
domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party
dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid
enormities, is itself a frightful despotism” (George Washington); and (2) “a division of the
republic into two great parties … is to be dreaded as the great political evil” (John Adams));
John C. Fortier, Polarised and Fractured U.S. Political Parties and the Challenges of
Governing, 14 EUR. VIEW 51 (2015) (observing a rise in polarization between the two
parties and the emergence of political independents).
147 BHUTAN CONST. art. 15.
148 Basic Law art. 21(1)[1].
149 BHUTAN CONST. arts. 7-8.
150 Id. at art. 15(1).
151 Id. at art. 15(2).
152 Id. at art. 9(2). For more detail regarding the uniquely Bhutanese concept of happiness
over domestic product coined by the Great Fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuck in the
1990s, see, for example, Dorji, supra note 56, at 79-80.
153 Id. at art. 15(5)-(7).
154
Id. at art. 15(8).
155 Opposition Party, HC Judgment, 10-100, supra note 16, at 27; Opposition Party, SC
Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.1. See BT. CONST. art. 18(1) (“The Opposition
Party shall play a constructive role to ensure that the Government and the ruling party
function in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, provide good governance
and strive to promote the national interest and fulfill the aspirations of the people.”).
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to contribute to the welfare of the Bhutanese nation, the Bhutanese society,
and the Bhutanese people.156
The High Court of Bhutan explains that Opposition Party standing
accrues collectively, not individually.157 Therefore, the Opposition Leader
acting alone does not have prima facie standing in the absence of securing the
signatures or expressions of written consent from all members of the
Opposition Party.158 Although the petition had only been signed by the leader
of the Opposition Party, the High Court deemed the submission in court by
the other member of the Opposition Party, which had consisted of only two
members, curative enough for purposes of implied consent.159
The Supreme Court of Bhutan adds several clarifications regarding
Opposition Party standing. A constitutional complaint by the Opposition Party
as a group can only be filed by the Opposition Leader who must produce a
writing that exhibits the written consent of all the party members and bears
the countersignature of the Secretary General of the National Assembly who
acts as a kind of notary public.160 In substance, such Opposition Party standing
requires that the trifecta of injury, causation and redressability be analyzed
with regard to the Opposition Party as a group.161 Incidentally, the Supreme
Court explains that members of the Opposition Party who wish to initiate
constitutional proceedings based on their individual standing must still meet
the form required for Opposition Party standing.162 Finally, according to the
Supreme Court in strong dicta, no standing analogue is available to a member
of the National Assembly in the Ruling Government because of the
constitutional bar with regard to party defections.163
Compared to the American doctrine of legislative standing, which
must clear a rigorous inquiry, Opposition Party standing in Bhutan has a
constitutional anchor. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law for
interbranch litigation with regard to the proper calibration between the
legislative and executive powers, a purely “institutional” injury short of a
complete nullification of votes is generally not sufficient for the requisite
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Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.1.
Opposition Party, HC Judgment, 10-100, supra note 16, at 28.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 30 (deciding to not move into merits of case based on outdated technical
hitches associated with the rules of standing would result in a grave lacuna and irreparable
harm; court called to remedy lack of consent of the other member of the Opposition Party).
160
Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at paras. 4.22.1.1, 5.1(b).
161 Id. at para. 5.2 (denying Opposition Party standing because the Opposition Party as such
was not affected by the Government’s executive decision to suspend the import of all light
vehicles).
162 See id.
163 Id. at para. 4.22.1.3.
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personal stake.164 In Opposition Party, the entire legislature was bypassed, as,
in the course of the Ruling Government’s maneuver, no vote whatsoever was
taken.
In addition to Opposition Party standing, the High Court and the
Supreme Court of Bhutan in Opposition Party explore two other variants of
standing that could allow the plaintiff into the courtroom.165 These doctrines
include taxpayer standing and public interest standing.
ii.

Taxpayer Standing

According to the High Court of Bhutan in Opposition Party, any
person who pays taxes has standing to initiate proceedings against the taxing
authority if the tax has been imposed in contravention of Bhutan’s
Constitution. This, says the court, flows from every person’s “right to
approach the courts in matters arising out of the Constitution.”166
The Bhutanese version of taxpayer standing thus appears less
constrained than its counterpart in the United States. While American theory
likewise allows those into court who claim to have been injured in the wake
of footing a share of expenditure that is unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme
Court has in practice tightened the screws by imposing conditions that are
designed to curtail lawsuits against the government over expenditures. 167
Under the Supreme Court’s modern test, where the plaintiff alleges an injury
connected to his or her status as a taxpayer, the plaintiff’s challenge must be
directed at an exercise of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause and, in addition, there must be a sufficient nexus between the plaintiff’s
taxpayer status and the concrete nature of the unconstitutionality alleged in
the complaint.168
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See, e.g., Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 1945,
204 L.Ed.2d 305 (2019) (Virginia state representatives lack standing to appeal lower court
ruling that state’s governor did not oppose); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312
(1997) (a group of six members of Congress challenging the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto passed by the 104th Congress without standing in their lawsuit against the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget). For
scholarship, see Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, Essay, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v.
Byrd and the Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontation,
86 GEO. L.J. 351 (1997).
165 Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, supra note 16, at 31.
166 BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(18).
167 McLelland & Walsh, supra note 132, at 15-16.
168 Id. at 16-20 (dissecting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) and progeny).
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Public Interest Standing

The plaintiff’s locus standi under the variant of the public interest
principle was affirmed by the High Court of Bhutan in Opposition Party.169
According to the High Court, the allegation of procedural and substantive
breaches associated with the introduction of tax measures in violation of
constitutional law is sufficient to trigger the principle.170 On appeal, the
appellant asserted that this type of standing had not been recognized by the
laws of Bhutan;171 however, the Supreme Court of Bhutan did not decide the
question or offer dicta in this regard.
Public interest standing is a Canadian doctrine. In Canada, the design
of the civil litigation system is generally predicated upon “standing as of right”
or “private standing,”172 which resembles the American standing doctrine in
that it is to ensure that only those with a personal investment and sufficient
stake in a case will have their day in court. In departure from the norm, public
interest standing enlarges the circle of plaintiffs by allowing more remote
actors such as interested parties or civil advocacy organizations to bring a case
when the law or policy subject to the challenge is deemed to affect important
matters of broader social import.173
Significant procedural and substantive requisites, however, limit the
scope of the public interest standing variant. Procedurally, the applicant must
successfully petition the court.174 In substance, the applicant must meet a
three-pronged test: first, the law or policy complained of raises a serious
validity issue that is justiciable; second, the plaintiff is either directly affected
by the law or policy or has a genuine interest with regard to its validity; and
third, there is no alternative reasonable and effective way to bring the issue
into a courtroom.175
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Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, supra note 16, at 29.
Id.
171 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 3.1, pt. III, no. 11.
172 The Expansion of Public Interest Standing, ALBERTA C.L. RSCH. CTR.,
http://www.aclrc.com/public-interest-standing (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
173 Canadian Council of Churches v. R., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (Can.) (referring to a trilogy
of cases handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada). For comparative scholarship, see
Gwendolyn McKee, Standing on a Spectrum: Third Party Standing in the United States,
Canada, and Australia, 16 BARRY L. REV. 115 (2011) (characterizing Canadian public
interest standing as a model of enhanced predictability and stability).
174 ALBERTA C.L. RSCH. CTR , supra note 172.
175 Canadian Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 236, para. 37 (Can.). See also ALBERTA C.L. RSCH. CTR , supra note 172
(discussing case law in support of the proposition that the strict third prong has given way
to “a more purposive approach”).
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V. JUDICIAL MANEUVERS: DECISIONAL SEQUENCING, STYLES OF
REASONING AND CANONS OF INTERPRETATION
Deciding the order under which a judicial opinion proceeds ranks
amongst the most fundamental thresholds in adjudging a case. Literature has
observed that while the parties generally control the issues they bring to the
court, the sequencing decision is generally made by the judge.176
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall skips the jurisdiction stage, although
it was common practice at the time to start with probing whether the court had
the power to decide the case in the first place.177 If he had started with
jurisdiction, then he would have needed to dismiss the case because Marbury
was not an ambassador, public minister or consul. This would have relegated
his constitutional discussion to mere dicta.178 Opting for a merits-based flow
of analysis through the prism of three substantive questions, Chief Justice
Marshall was able to say that Marbury was right in principle, but he had
chosen the wrong court.179 Expressed in modern categories, Chief Justice
Marshall’s maneuvering connotes what has been called “porzia” or purposive
jurisprudence towards a desired result. 180
Opposition Party is much more conventional in this sense. Before
launching into the merits stage, the High Court of Bhutan pauses to identify
the standing questions it will answer before determining the constitutionality
questions raised in the case.181 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Bhutan
addresses jurisdiction before merits when elaborating the High Court’s
original jurisdiction in matters “involving a substantial question of law of
general importance relating to the interpretation of this Constitution.”182
Both Marbury and Opposition Party appear influenced by continental
conceptions of rationalist respect for texts and principles. Citations to case law
are sparse in both decisions. In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall, however,
refers to a common law tandem of universally renowned jurists that have
shaped Anglo-American legal history—William Blackstone, the author of the
Commentaries, and Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench.183
176

Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations
from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 303 (2011).
177 ABERNATHY & PUDER, supra note 59, at 171.
178 Id.
179 See Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the
Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607, 610 (2001).
180 ERNST FUCHS, GERECHTIGKEITSWISSENSCHAFT – AUSGEWÄHLTE SCHRIFTEN ZUR
FREIRECHTSLEHRE 26 (Albert S. Foulkes & Arthur Kaufmann eds., 1965) (invoking
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice).
181 Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, supra note 16, at para. 15, p.26.
182 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 5.5.
183 Julian S. Waterman, Mansfield and Blackstone’s Commentaries, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 549,
549 (1934).
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Both authorities are ostensibly invoked to explain the operations of the writ
of mandamus. But, at a psychological level, this could have been another
subtlety directed at Jefferson who considered the “honied Mansfieldism of
Blackstone”184 anathema to democratic government. In Opposition Party,
neither the High Court of Bhutan nor the Supreme Court of Bhutan refer to
case law. But in its final exhortation of its power of judicial review, the
Supreme Court enlists the transcendental authority associated with the rule of
law and the wisdom of the Noble King of Bhutan.185
In exercising their judicial review power, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Marbury and the High Court of Bhutan and the Supreme Court of Bhutan in
Opposition Party run canons of constitutional and statutory construction that,
at first blush, promise to limit predisposed posturing of judges and therefore,
guard against judicial activism. Under closer scrutiny, however, a more
complex picture emerges.186 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall does not
identify particular canons of interpretation beyond assuring the reader of his
commitment to obey the text as the expression of rationally determinate law—
an approach we would today associate with the school of legal formalism.187
When holding that Congress was not in the legal position to add by statute to
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall reads the
affirmative reference to appellate jurisdiction in the constitutional text as an
implied negation of Congress’s prerogative to expand the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction.188 Chief Justice Marshall thus effectively deploys the
Latin maxim of “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,”189 which means that
the expression of one thing implies negatively that anything else not identified

184

Id. at 553, n.27.
Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at 91 (“court order”).
186 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Academic Highlight: Substantive Canons in the Roberts
Court,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan.
5,
2018,
11:12
AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/01/academic-highlight-substantive-canons-robertscourt/ (“The conventional wisdom is that substantive canons serve as unpredictable
interpretive trump cards, the equivalent of a rabbit pulled out of a hat by judges seeking to
reject the statute’s plain meaning or congressional intent in favor of a reading they like
better.”). For more detailed scholarly elaboration, Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (2017).
187 See e.g., Paul Troop, Why Legal Formalism Is Not a Stupid Thing, 31 RATIO JURIS 428,
428 (2018) (distinguishing “doctrinal formalism” as “the view that judicial behavior can
be represented using rules” and “rule formalism” as “the view that judges follow external
rules when they are deciding cases”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (“Formalist doctrine is
characterized by working out of the implications of law from a standpoint internal to law”).
188 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-75.
189 Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33
CAMPBELL L. REV. 115, 130-31 (2010); David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791, 1919 (1998).
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is excluded.190 Literature has split not only as to the propriety of this canon
for purposes of constitutional interpretation,191 but also as to the inevitability
of the outcome suggested by Chief Justice Marshall.192 Moreover, Chief
Justice Marshall makes no effort to save the statute and avoid its
unconstitutionality. As has been noted in the literature, he could very well
have given it a construction within the constitutional envelope and without
changing the ultimate outcome of the case.193 In this light, Chief Justice
Marshall eschews what in modern legal parlance has come to be known as the
Brandeis rule of constitutional avoidance.194 In judicial practice, the canon is
enormously significant as it operates to curtail the potential sweep of judicial
review by permitting a court to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids
delving into difficult questions of constitutional law. 195
Avoiding
constitutional questions was not a novel idea as Chief Justice Marshall himself
was to confirm in a decision only three decades after Marbury.196 Indeed, in
yet another decision from the Marbury era, Chief Justice Marshall had
announced a similar canon when holding that national statutes should be
interpreted in a way that avoided a collision with the law of nations. 197
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Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33
CAMPBELL L. REV. 115, 130-31 (2010).
191 Id. at 131-33 (offering quotes from the leading voices in a debate conducted at the turn
of the millennium).
192 Golove, supra note 189, at 1921-22 (explaining in the text and in the footnotes that most
modern scholars read the constitutional clause as non-exclusive).
193 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 102829 n. 128 (194) (“First, the statute in Marbury might have been construed to apply only to
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, because no other type of jurisdiction was mentioned in
the statute. Second, the statute could have been construed as only granting the Court
remedial power to issue mandamus when the Court has jurisdiction.”).
194 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case
may be disposed of.”). See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICs 16-17 (1962).
195 For a comprehensive review of the doctrine, along with numerous references to
jurisprudence and literature, see ANDREW NOLAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43706, THE
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 3 (2014).
196 Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,558) (no questions of
“greater delicacy” can be presented to the federal courts than those that raise a
constitutional challenge to a legislative act).
197
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). For scholarship, see, for
example, Justin Hughes, The Charming Betsy Canon, American Legal Doctrine, and
Global Rule of Law, 53 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1147 (2020); See The Charming Betsy
Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary International Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215
(2008); Roger P. Alford, Foreign Relations as a Matter of Interpretation: The Use and
Abuse of Charming Betsy, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1339 (2006).
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Ultimately then, despite its formalist veneer, Marbury could be characterized
as an early expression of legal realism.198
Unlike Marbury, the High Court of Bhutan in Opposition Party
positively identifies the construction rules or tests it will use to decide the
case: “the words, of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the
object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”199 This language recalls
the classic methods of interpretation in Germany, which go back to Friedrich
Carl von Savigny, the founder of the historical school of the 19th Century, who
had distinguished between textual or grammatical interpretation, contextual
interpretation, historical interpretation and teleological or purposive
interpretation.200 In regards to interpretation across statutes enacted at
different times but related to the same subject, the High Court looks for
answers by deploying the principles of “harmonious construction” and “in
pari materia”—tools known all over the world that allow courts to treat two
statutes as though they were one.201 Finally, the High Court of Bhutan and the
Supreme Court of Bhutan offer insights into the operations and limits of
constitutional avoidance in their judicial practice. Both courts note their
commitment and adherence to the doctrine, which, according to Supreme
Court of Bhutan, flows from what it calls “the canon of judicial selfrestraint.”202 By the same token, says the Supreme Court, the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance “is intertwined with the debate over the proper scope
of judicial review and the allocation of power among the three branches of the
government.”203 Therefore, the doctrine cannot operate to chip away at the
constitutionally mandated robustness of judicial review entrusted with the
Supreme Court of Bhutan as the guardian of Bhutan’s Constitution and final
authority when it comes to its interpretation.204
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For the proposition that the legal regime in the United States accommodates a formalistrealist blend, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False
Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2491, 2493 (2014)
(“There may not be any absolute formalists on [the courts], but it may also be the case that
perfect realists are very scarce or even nonexistent.”).
199 Opposition Party, HC Judgment 10-100, supra note 16, at 42.
200 Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology:
Some Remarks from the German Perspective, 42 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 395 (1994).
201
See generally Anuj C. Desai, The Dilemma of Interstatutory Interpretation, 77 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 177 (2020). See also Francis J. McCaffrey, The Rule in Pari Materia As an
Aid to Statutory Construction, 3 LAW & L. NOTES 11 (1949).
202 Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at para. 6.3.
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VI. LEGACIES AND PERSPECTIVES
Under a narrow read, Marbury literally holds that the judicial branch
will not behave unconstitutionally when asked by the political branches. But
the contemporary understanding of judicial review construes Marbury as a
rejection of the conception of coordination and self-examination in favor of
judicial primacy.205 Judicial review, as we know it today, really took off in the
era of the New Deal of the 1930s. Faced with a U.S. Supreme Court they saw
disposed to declare the crucial legislation unconstitutional, the proponents of
the New Deal did not argue for a narrow construction of judicial review, but
rather embarked upon a strategy of capturing the high court to harness its
power to their advantage.206 These efforts culminated in President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s court packing plan to stack the court with allies and secure
the survival of the New Deal. 207 The plan was never enacted,208 but “the
switch in time that saved nine”209 left the New Deal intact. Yet, over the
decades, the battles over the high court have continued. They have not only
led to new terminology such as “borking” to describe the stalling of nominees
in the confirmation process,210 but also to renewed discussions about control
tools such as revisiting the size of the Supreme Court,211 installing age or term

Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Marbury “declared the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that the
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”).
206 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 463
(1987).
207 Andrew Glass, This Day in Politics – FDR Unveils ‘Court-Packing’ Plan, POLITICO
(Feb. 5, 2019, 12:02 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/05/fdr-court-packing1937-1144296.
208
FDR’s
“Court-Packing”
Plan,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/fdrs-court-packing-plan (last visited Nov. 9, 2021).
209 For a wealth of quantitative evidence to elucidate Justice Robert’s transformation, see
Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 69,
70 (2010).
210 Jane Coaston, “Borking,” Explained: Why a Failed Supreme Court Nomination in 1987
Matters, VOX (Sept. 27, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/26/17896126/borkkavanaugh-supreme-court-conservatives-republicans.
211 Richard Wolf, Pack the Court? Battles between Republicans and Democrats Fuel Clash
over Supreme Court’s Future, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2020, 3:56 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/10/25/could-amy-coney-barrettsconfirmation-fuel-supreme-court-expansion/3716562001/.
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limits for the Justices,212 rotating Justices off the high court,213 or restricting
the cases the high court can hear.214
Opposition Party is unequivocal with regard to the full power of
judicial review. Yet, over the past decade, the High Court of Bhutan and the
Supreme Court of Bhutan have exercised their judicial review powers on
limited occasions only.215 But even if the trend were to accelerate, the design
approach chosen by Bhutan’s Constitution for the Supreme Court of Bhutan
appears, at first blush, more resilient against the political drama and mischief
seen in the United States. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which does not
establish the size of the U.S. Supreme Court, Bhutan’s Constitution prescribes
that the Supreme Court of Bhutan shall consist of one Chief Justice and four
Associate Justices (Drangpons).216 Moreover, in contrast to their American
colleagues, the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of Supreme Court of
Bhutan are subject to limited tenures of five and ten years respectively, with
an absolute maximum age of sixty-five years.217
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Russell Berman, No Other Western Democracy Allows This: Only in America Does So
Much Power Rest in the Hands of Elderly Judges, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2020),
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2020,
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Narcotics Control Authority – over express language in the Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic
Substance and Substance Abuse Act of Bhutan 2015 – to list Spasmo Proxyon Plus (SP+)
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Judgment Allows Convicts in SP+ Cases to Pay Thrimthue, BBS (July 27, 2017),
http://www.bbs.bt/news/?p=77038. For a summary of the 2018 amendments of the
Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substance and Substance Abuse Act of Bhutan, which
included, among others, the transfer of the competence to amend those schedules from the
Parliament to the Narcotics Control Authority, with the Parliament retaining the right to be
informed of changes in the scope of national control, see International Narcotics Control
Board, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2018, at 80 (2019),
https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2018/Annual_Report/A
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217 Id. at art. 21(6).
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Finally, the appointment clauses in the United States and in Bhutan
differ considerably. In the United States, the power is shared between the
President and the Senate.218 Before receiving the ultimate appointment by the
President, the candidate nominated by the President must be approved by the
Senate.219 Under Bhutan’s Constitution, the King holds the appointment
power, with advisory input from the National Judicial Commission,220 which
consists of the Chief Justice of Bhutan as Chair, the most senior Drangpon of
the Supreme Court, the Chair of the Legislative Committee of the National
Assembly, and the Attorney General.221 Thus, when the National Judicial
Commission forwards a name, the recommendation reflects the involvement
of all three branches of government. This constitutional design was put to a
test when the previous Chief Justice was selected.222 As his predecessor had
already left the office, the National Judicial Commission lacked one of its four
members.223 For purposes of avoiding a vacuum, the King stepped in by
issuing a royal decree constituting an ad hoc committee to put forward a
name.224 Literature has asserted that the fix was not in line with the letter of
Bhutan’s Constitution.225 Yet, the power of appointment ultimately resides
with the King, while the prerogative of the National Judicial Commission is
one of process and input—consultation. This is perhaps one of the reasons
why there was no talk whatsoever among political actors about the potential
for a constitutional crisis in Bhutan.
Despite its archaic and terse language, Marbury has been revered and
cited worldwide as a model for countries with a constitution and courts. Our
journey revealed that Bhutan’s Marbury moment arrived with the seminal
judgments of the High Court of Bhutan and the Supreme Court of Bhutan in
Opposition Party. But the couplet of decisions also shows that, guided by the
Constitution of Bhutan and with the Supreme Court of Bhutan as its guardian,
Bhutan has charted its own path towards weaving a tapestry of vibrant
constitutionalism.
In Opposition Party, the Supreme Court closes its judgment with a
powerful summation of what constitutionalism means for Bhutan’s
commitment to a successful system of democratic governance:
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See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE
CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 33 (1968) (describing
the distribution of roles as a compromise between those who favored appointments by the
legislature and those who militated for the chief executive).
219 Id.
220
BHUTAN CONST. art. 21(4).
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Constitutionalism is an anti-thesis to autocracy. Therefore,
the Constitution has different centers of power under
vertical, horizontal and intra check and balance ensured
through separation of power. The Constitution has carefully
crafted the checks and balance inherent to constitutionalism.
It prevents power from being concentrated in too few hands,
which could result in an autocratic and dictatorial
government. Constitutionalism embodies the philosophy of
limited government and Bhutan has established a
constitutional democratic system of governance as clarified
by His Majesty the King during the public consultation of
the Constitution in Trashi Yangtse that “in future we must
have strong and stable country befitting to the people’s
welfare”. Therefore, the Constitution prevents power from
being fragmented in a manner that could lead to an
ineffectual and unstable government.226
The Supreme Court’s auspicious incantation of constitutionalism as
a resilient bulwark of democracy and a safe haven of harmony reminds us of
lozé (བློ་ཟེ་), Bhutan’s rich genre of storytelling,227 albeit reduced to writing. Sis
felix!

Opposition Party, SC Judgment 11-1, supra note 16, at p. 91 (“court order”).
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BHUTAN
CULTURAL
LIBRARY
(2017),
https://texts.shanti.virginia.edu/book_pubreader/40787.
226
227

